The equivalent targets to regulate in the world of AI technology are the facilities that produce the microchips that are essential to the operation of AI algorithms. This is well recognised by the US government, which has imposed punitive restrictions on the export to China not only of advanced microchips, but also the production equipment to make them.

While it is well known that the dimensions and cost of transistors on a microchip have been shrinking for decades, what is less well known is that the dimensions and cost of fabrication plants to make the increasingly powerful microchips have been inexorably rising, with the cost of building a modern fabrication plant estimated to be at least $US3 billion and as much as $US20 billion. These massive and complex plants are huge and could be easily monitored by international audit teams.

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To be successful, an AI non-proliferation treaty would have to be agreed by every technologically advanced country or jurisdiction, including the US, China, Europe, Taiwan and many others, despite the certain objections of the defence communities in every country. Exceptions could not be allowed because non-participation would be an enormous advantage in the technological arms race.

One of the most important details of the treaty would be agreement on the level of capability that should not be exceeded. The definition would have to be stunningly simple so that it could not be ambiguously interpreted. For example, the level of capability could be defined as the maximum number of transistors per microchip. Limits such as no more than 100 billion might be agreed.

Of course, we need computer microchips for our smartphones, our banking systems and our satellite navigation systems. But do we need the extraordinarily powerful microchips that power generative AI? What defines the line between adequate power and ultimate power? What would we be giving up in exchange for protection against malevolent uses of AI?

Like the effort to tackle climate change, negotiating an international non-proliferation agreement would require collaboration on an exceptional scale. Given the explosive rate of development in AI, the global community cannot afford to drag its feet. For internationally agreed approaches to be efficacious before the AI tsunami doubles or quadruples again, the aim would be to negotiate an agreement within a year or two. In acknowledgment of the newness of the approach, the agreement would trigger its own renegotiation after an interval of five years or thereabouts.

Who will show leadership on negotiating an AI non-proliferation treaty? It is a collective responsibility and certainly one to which Australia could contribute.

Alan Finkel is an Australian neuroscientist, inventor, researcher, entrepreneur, educator, policy advisor, and philanthropist. He was Australia’s chief scientist from 2016 to 2020.

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