Depending on your personal preference, this article is 'not another bloody housing bubble article' or, well…. Okay, let's move on.

There have been plenty of column inches (for those that can't afford a house these days, that's when we got our news first in actual paper form) spent trying to dissect whether or not we're in a bubble, and if so, when and why it'll pop.

And, from the look of my Twitter feed and the comments on these sorts of articles, there's plenty of confirmation bias going on. The Millennials and younger GenXers are complaining about the state of things, variously whinging about prices and blaming their parents.

Older Xs and Boomers are wondering why the youngsters don't just cut back on their spending and move out to the suburbs like they did when they bought their first houses.

Can't we just blame someone? 

And, as with most of these sorts of debates, there's truth in both arguments.

First though, to prices themselves. Our household debt is around 3 times as high, as a proportion of our incomes, than it was in the early 1990s. Housing, particularly in the go-go cities of Sydney and Melbourne, is some of the least affordable in the world. I am yet to find anyone who argues -- with a straight face -- that Australian house prices are anything but bloody expensive.

Pollies blame each other -- the Feds say supply constraints and stamp duty is to blame. The States say it's a negative gearing problem. Others in the debate are calling for the capital gains tax discount to be reduced or removed. And there's the environmental and social impacts of urban sprawl to consider, too.

Meanwhile, poor APRA and the Reserve Bank are doing what little they can to try to fix the problem, and to stop it getting further out of control. Glenn Stevens, former RBA governor, was the master of the jawbone -- trying to talk markets, investors and consumers into acting properly, but other than interest rates, he could do very little. APRA has become inventive in the 'carrot and stick' approach it's been using with the banks.

The question, of course, is what you do about it. Those who've sat out of the market while prices rose 30 per cent, 50 per cent and 70 per cent are kicking themselves. And the bad news is that even if prices fall 20 per cent tomorrow, only the first group are going to be better off.

Abandoning all logic and simply capitulating doesn't make sense either, though. Financial history is littered with the financial corpses of those who paid no heed to prices or valuations, with the almost-forgotten dot.com boom and crash perhaps the most recent stock market example.

It's a vexed problem. I agree with Fairfax's Jess Irvine, who said earlier this week that she can't see the catalyst that pops what might otherwise be a bubble. We have no clear evidence of pure speculation or house flipping that characterised US housing before the GFC. There's no clear sense that investors are borrowing more than they can afford to repay -- particularly when vacancy rates are relatively low. As long as renters keep renting, those cashflows keep coming.

Of course, the other side of the argument is that the catalysts that pop bubbles are rarely obvious in advance. Hindsight is always 20/20 and everyone pretends they knew, but few really do -- and even fewer can do it regularly enough to distinguish their success from luck.

And the so-called solutions are rarely pure policy suggestions. For governments, the conversation is framed around the votes they can win or lose based on each policy outcome, then the impact on the budget. Home-owners empathise with those who see housing as expensive, but are unwilling to do anything that causes values to fall. And the would-be homeowners are generally happy with any policy prescription that sees prices fall, no matter how logical or otherwise it may be.

And, I should add, those are gross generalisations. There are plenty of Boomers who are actively promoting real solutions to affordability. And plenty of Millennials who wish housing was cheaper, but realise there's no quick fix.

Maybe the market will simply sort things out over time. Perth readers know well that property prices can fall as well as rise, something their Eastern Seaboard brethren haven't experienced in a long time.

Were I handed the keys to The Lodge for a month or two, I don't know that I'd have a clear solution. Home ownership is certainly a worthy goal, but perhaps it shouldn't be as exalted as it is. Falling house prices could well be a catalyst for a broader economic slowdown or recession. And the choice between jobs and more affordable housing is a pretty simple one -- if you don't have work, it doesn't matter how cheap property gets.

Of course, that's not how this works. Commentators and 'experts' are supposed to have an answer. But, as with all things to do with the future, the more certain the forecaster, the more sceptical we should be. But here's my take:

Housing affordability in seven steps

1. It strikes me that if companies can deduct interest costs from their tax bill, individual investors should be afforded the same option, whether it's in housing, shares or Calathumpian marbles. So I wouldn't touch negative gearing.

2. I think there's absolute benefit in 'nudging' investors to hold assets for the long term, but maybe the discount is too high. I might wind the discount back to 33 per cent (from 50 per cent), and increase the minimum holding period to two years.

3. I wouldn't touch stamp duty -- I think it's a dampener on speculation and house flipping. Economists hate it on ideological grounds, but on pragmatic grounds, it's a winner.

4. I'd encourage state governments to release more land, but only where there is sufficient social and transport infrastructure to support it, and where it can be done in a low impact way, environmentally.

5. I wouldn't tax vacant housing: I don't think government should have a role in telling me that I have to use an asset I own.

6. Here's perhaps the most radical part: I'd change lending practices. The first lending change would be to limit lending not on the basis of comparing the loan to the value of the house. Instead, I'd set a minimum ratio of repayments to rents. That stops investors speculating on house price increases while collecting rental yields of 1.5 per cent or 2 per cent. I'd only let borrowers get loans where the rent covers a set percentage of the repayments.

7. Secondly on lending, I'd ban interest-only borrowing for residential property. If you don't have any intention of paying off the principal, you're an unacceptable risk, and likely either borrowing more than you can afford, or you're speculating that price increases will do the heavy lifting for you. Both of those are bad investment approaches and has negative consequences for society.

Foolish takeaway

Disagree with what I've suggested? You're in luck -- I'm not likely to be Prime Minister any time soon. Government intervention in the operation (as opposed to regulation) of markets rarely ends well, but it's time to think proactively and differently on how to fix an overvalued housing market -- before it becomes unequivocally a bubble.

New report: The "blue chips" of tomorrow aren't the blue chips of yesterday. If you want to look forward rather than backward, we've released our three best ideas for 2017. Click here to learn more.

Scott Phillips is the Motley Fool's director of research. You can follow Scott on Twitter @TMFScottP. The Motley Fool's purpose is to educate, amuse and enrich investors. This article contains general investment advice only (under AFSL 400691).