And yet, sadly, it isn’t enough. China has not yet put an end to building domestic thermal coal generation and production. The 14th Five-Year Plan (for 2021 to 2025) contains language on “promoting the clean use of coal”; 43 new coal-fired power plant units were announced in the first half of this year; these will emit an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year if approved and built, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. In short, China continues to hedge its targets. It has not yet submitted an enhanced pledge to the UN climate convention (known as a nationally determined contribution, or NDC), but its pledge to peak domestic greenhouse-gas emissions by 2030 is relatively unambitious; its Five-Year Plan also could have contained an absolute cap on carbon dioxide emissions, but it didn’t.

This can also largely be explained by domestic politics and economic concerns. Contrary to common assumptions, Chinese policymaking is neither smoothly technocratic nor necessarily well planned: there is a balancing act among elite factions, and between core and periphery. Environmental lobbies within China’s leadership still face an uphill battle to increase domestic ambition when faced with powerful incumbents. Concerns about employment in China’s rust belt, energy security, and economic stability — see recent wobbles over Evergrande — face off against an argument for low-carbon growth that is equally rooted in political economy. This contentious domestic debate will, in turn, affect China’s eventual negotiating position, and, at the very least, put limits on its diplomatic flexibility at Glasgow.

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It’s possible that China falls back on a familiar script at Glasgow and takes an aggressive diplomatic posture, when instead some loftiness is needed to achieve multilateral commitment and progress. There are critical areas where China could instead demonstrate leadership, by enhancing its targets, ramping down domestic coal and championing the 1.5 degrees target. But China isn’t the only one that will need to step up.

US President Biden might have rejoined the Paris Agreement, but unless he helps to close the yawning gap on the annual $US100 billion climate finance goal agreed at Paris, it will further entrench mistrust in the global south. Australia plays a role, too: its climate finance contributions have been meagre (“critically insufficient”, according to Climate Action Tracker) and its support for fossil fuels overseas continues. If the rich world fails to demonstrate solidarity and leadership, it will have no moral standing to criticise China. If the talks can’t get back on track, Xi’s absenteeism will not be the reason and will be the least of our problems.

Dr Sam Geall is the chief executive of Chinadialogue.net and an associate fellow at Chatham House.

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