This week, during my visit to Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow. Coming on the heels of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant, and his midnight visit to Russian-occupied Mariupol, it was a statement of support for a Russo-Chinese version of “the international order”.

Russia is desperate for such shows of support – as well as an economic lifeline. Its invasion of Ukraine has become a morass for the Russians. They have very little to show for the continuous flow of coffins back to Russia. They are running short on munitions and armoured vehicles. Economic sanctions are hurting Russian manufacturing of high-tech items, especially weapons. So the Chinese president’s journey of friendship and support comes at a good time for Putin.

It is also a welcome distraction from Russia’s mediocre performance in its 2023 offensive in eastern Ukraine. Begun in January, and featuring Russian attacks at Kreminna, Bakhmut, Vuhledar and elsewhere, the Russians have expended massive resources for very little territorial gain so far. It could be that the Russian operations since January are a preliminary series of actions, with a campaign of larger scope to be launched after the Ukrainian so-called mud season. But you are more likely to win a wager on the Redcliffe Dolphins claiming the 2023 NRL premiership than betting on Russian large-scale battlefield success.

Therefore, Putin will be hoping to wrangle some form of military assistance from China because, as bad as the battlefield situation is for Russia now, it is about to get worse. Ukraine, which has long telegraphed its 2023 offensives, is likely to launch these attacks in the next few months. The Ukrainians, who will be fighting with first-rate Western tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and support, will pose a massive challenge to Russia’s hold on its occupied territory. As the Ukrainians have shown at Kyiv, Kherson and Kharkiv, they – unlike the Russians – know how to plan and conduct successful large-scale offensives.

Xi, who is canny enough to recognise his strong hand, is unlikely to want to further antagonise the Americans or risk economic sanctions that would imperil his already low 5 per cent growth projections. But, he also needs the war to continue for the time being so that Russia has some chance of achieving its goals and so the US and Europe remain fixated on European security challenges. The longer they remain distracted, the more time Xi has to achieve his strategic designs for the western Pacific with minimal US interference.

How might Xi achieve this balancing act?

First, it is likely the two countries could expand intelligence sharing. This is an inevitable part of such co-operation between nations. While it is probable that China is already sharing information with Russia about decision-making in Washington DC and European capitals, it could expand such collaboration.

Second, China might provide dual-use technologies that could be employed in either civil industry or the production of Russian defence material. Chinese exports to Russia have surged this year, and the provision of dual-use technologies would be more difficult for the US and Europe to counter than direct military assistance like munitions.