The ceasefire in Lebanon is testimony to the exhaustion felt by both sides rather than any lasting resolution of the near half-century conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel learnt the lessons of its disastrous 2006 war by limiting its ground manoeuvre component this time around and pounding Hezbollah and Lebanon from the air, where it reigns supreme.

Hezbollah has been dealt a grievous blow and paid a heavy price for its continuing support for the Palestinian cause in Gaza. By tying any ceasefire agreement in Lebanon to a ceasefire in Gaza, Hezbollah and Iran bet that it could pressure Israel on a second front without Israel fighting on a second front. They miscalculated. As a result, Hezbollah’s leadership has been decimated and its weapons stockpiles have been greatly reduced. Moreover, Israel’s ability to target its senior leadership and to introduce booby-trapped pagers into its supply chain showed the organisation was deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence.

Israel has forced Hezbollah and Iran to decouple their fight with Israel from the conflict in Gaza. And the political aim of Israel’s mission – to allow the return of 60,000 Israelis displaced from their country’s north because of the fighting – may well be achieved in they want to return and have the confidence to do so. These are all significant tactical military and political victories.

And yet for all the claims of precision strikes and clearing of the border area and of setting Hezbollah back decades, the reality is that this was yet another, albeit more damaging, instance of “mowing the grass”.

Hezbollah is a multi-faceted organisation and its Lebanese political wing remains essentially intact. The idea that Hezbollah will withdraw to north of the Litani River and take its weapons with it while the Lebanese military protects the border with Israel ignores the fact that much of Hezbollah actually lives south of the Litani River and will simply return to their homes and rebuild. It is also a hard ask for the Lebanese military to support the proposal after Israeli airstrikes have killed dozens of their fellow soldiers.

Like the Israeli military, Hezbollah is an adaptive organisation, and it will learn many lessons from its performance in this round of the never-ending conflict. It will claim that it fought to the end and was still launching dozens of rockets into Israel until the ceasefire despite the technology Israel used against it. It will obviously review its internal security processes and the next cadre of leaders will already have been blooded over this past year of conflict.

Reconstituting its stockpiles of weapons may well take some years to achieve, but the organisation will focus on reconstituting its military wing and reinforcing its support base by rebuilding that which Israel destroyed. And this is where Iranian money, more than weapons, will be the focus for support in the short term. Where the state is weak, as in Lebanon, semi-state actors such as Hezbollah rely on their ability to provide their supporters services – more than weapons – as a measure of their influence.

Hezbollah has many enemies in Lebanon, and there will be many who decry its decision to support Hamas by launching attacks against Israel. Risking Lebanese lives to support Palestinians is not a popular position. But Israel has many more enemies in Lebanon than does Hezbollah. And its military campaign has only added to the enmity felt by Lebanese against Israel and its military. Israeli aircraft have bombed their country with impunity, killing several thousand civilians and 40 members of the Lebanese military. Soldiers have planted Israeli flags on their territory and made offensive social media posts about their country. These have all reinforced the hostile Lebanese view of Israel.