Over the past few days, the Twittersphere has been expounding on the impact that several HIMARS rocket artillery systems are having in Ukraine. These systems have provided the Ukrainian armed forces with a new “long hand” with which to attack the Russian invaders. However, some perspective is required before expectations for their impact get too overblown. There is no such thing as a silver bullet solution in war.

HIMARS, short for High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, is an American truck mounted rocket launch platform. It is a lighter, more deployable version of an older tracked launcher that used the same rockets. HIMARS fires rockets in either six round configurations, with a range of 80 kilometres, or a longer-range single missile that can hit targets out to 300 km. And because it is mobile, it can shoot and move quickly, making it a very survivable platform in an era of short times between detection and destruction.

The HIMARS, because of its range and accuracy, is a weapon that is designed to attack targets deep in the enemy’s rear. Unlike artillery howitzers, which are used in a tactical role to attack troops and other targets close to the front line, HIMARS is used to destroy critical communications nodes, command posts, airfields, and important logistics facilities.

Of note, the Ukrainians so far have only been provided with the shorter-range 80 km rockets. But they have been quick to use them in the war since their provision by the Americans just a few weeks ago.

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It appears that more than a dozen major Russian supply depots, primarily used to store artillery ammunition, have been attacked by the long range HIMARS rockets in the past few days. The Ukrainians, shifting away from the attritional fight they have been drawn into in the Donbas, are re-adopting the asymmetric conventional tactics they used so successfully early in the war. They are attacking the Russian weak points once again – its railway centric logistics, its over talkative battlefield generals, and its over reliance on massed artillery to advance in the east.

The precision of the HIMARS is of great utility. One key target is command and control nodes, or in other words, command posts with senior Russian commanders. These are not large targets and are generally outside the range of Ukraine’s other artillery systems. The ability to rapidly target these, once detected, and use the accuracy of the HIMARS rockets to inflict maximum destruction is vital.

Additionally, many Russian supply depots, located close to railways, are also proximate to civilian towns. The greater accuracy of the HIMARS permits the Ukrainians to minimise collateral damage in their long-range attacks on Russian targets.

Beyond the physical, there is a psychological impact. Now, a much greater proportion of the invading Russian force falls within the radius that can be attacked. They will have seen its impact, on social media and in person. And, as my colleague General Ben Hodges has noted, being an ammunition handler in a logistic depot is probably now the least desirable job in the Russian army. These psychological impacts have a cost on the effectiveness of a military organisation.