The past two weeks have seen two significant decisions that are indicative of Russia once again changing its strategy for its war against Ukraine. On September 21, President Putin announced that he would “support the proposal of the defence ministry and the general staff on partial mobilisation” for hundreds of thousands of additional troops for Ukraine. Then, on September 30, Putin proclaimed the formal annexation of four Ukrainian provinces into Russia.

Taken together, these represent a significant escalation in the war by Russia. Putin hopes that by annexing these four provinces, and mobilising more soldiers to defend them, he might seize back the strategic initiative in this war. He will also wish to prolong it in the hope that Western populations will grow tired of the conflict and force the Ukrainians into an accommodation favourable to Russia.

There was a minimalist response from Canberra. A media release was quietly issued by the government on Sunday. It aligned with Australia’s overall strategy for Ukraine that is best described as small and slow: we promise small amounts of assistance irregularly, and then are slow to deliver it.

So far, the Australian government has committed approximately $388 million in aid, of all types, for Ukraine. This is significantly less than even the annual cost of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan between 2007 and 2016. Given the total of all government outlays for 2021-2022 was just over $623 billion, Ukraine aid of $388 million represents just 0.06 per cent of government spending for the last financial year.

As the world’s 13th largest economy, and a nation that has regularly sent its people to the far side of the globe to defend other democracies, this small contribution is puzzling. There are ample reasons for why Australia should be at the forefront of providing more military, economic and humanitarian aid to the Ukrainians.

First, while the momentum in this war is with the Ukrainian military, the influx of Russian troops over the coming months will slow down military operations and draw out the fighting. The Ukrainians will need an increased flow of economic assistance as well as military equipment and munitions, to see off this threat – and secure victory - over the coming year.

Second, Australia’s aid to Ukraine sends a message to friends and partners in our region that we are a reliable security partner upon whom they can rely in times of strife. Words are very fine things, but in security affairs, it is timely and well-considered actions that ultimately matter. An increased flow of more regular aid to Ukraine would reassure our immediate region that we will make sacrifices on their behalf as well if they are threatened.

Third, Australian assistance should be part of our nascent – and yet to be fully formed – national deterrent capacity. The message we send to authoritarian regimes, especially in Beijing and Pyongyang, is that if we are willing to make such sacrifices for Ukraine, a country we hardly know, imagine what we would do for our friends and partners throughout the Pacific. This is a point that appears to be lost on our risk-averse bureaucrats in Canberra.