A number of the media organs mentioned in the book are located outside China. Significantly, a number of overseas media companies have been taken over by pro-Beijing interests, while many have succumbed to the financial lure of Chinese state advertorials.

Kurlantzick argues that both powers, soft and sharp, work together. Certainly, the regime in Beijing disputes its use of coercion. He catalogues a range of media, for instance, Xinhua News Agency, The Global Times, China Daily; and television services such as China Global TV network (CGTN) and the digital service Star Times.

He explains how foreign guests on Chinese TV talk shows are carefully screened so that they don’t criticise the regime. He points to how the Chinese media have amplified Russian disinformation about Ukraine on their news services but at the same time contends that there has been a blackout about Ukraine. In reality, China’s CCTV news, while giving greater credence to Russia, also provides a perspective from Ukraine. In the west we see one side.

Kurlantzick also talks about Beijing’s desire to “control the pipes”, referring to the electronic distribution channels. In fact, many overseas Chinese subscribe to mainland Chinese pipe services and get their news direct and fresh from the source without having to bother about local news services, which present limited news about China, or news that is negative. The book examines popular messaging apps such as WeChat and Weibo that service the Chinese diaspora and provides evidence from studies that claim that these are monitored from China.

Beijing’s Global Media Offensive extends beyond media. It looks at the workings of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), what Kurlantzick terms “old-fashioned” tools of influence, including personal contacts, particularly the penetration of overseas Chinese communities.

The evidence presented comes from English language sources, most of which are available online. The interview sources are mostly anonymous, such as experts within US agencies such as the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and the Centre for Naval Analyses (CAN). It should be noted that Kurlantzick works at the Council for Foreign Relations, which according to its mission statement is a think-tank dedicated to international questions facing the US.

Chinese sources are presented anecdotally. Kurlantzick briefly mentions Chinese leaders, policymakers and academics he spoke with “at the time”, but we don’t know who these people actually are, when, and where such conversations occurred.

The book advances a compelling argument to see the Chinese government as directing an offensive, but in the interests of balance more could have been said about the relations between governments and media in the countries that are being infiltrated. Media in liberal democracies generally frame China in line with foreign-affairs advice and currently China is framed as untrustworthy and threatening, a narrative that is stoking the embers of a new Cold War.

The key question therefore is: how does the expansion of Chinese media impact on the political culture of those it seeks to influence? It seems from the evidence that the media offensive is counterproductive in liberal democracies but works better in authoritarian states.

It is also important to emphasise that all governments seek to influence the world through their media. The aim of Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, however, is to show why “Beijing” must be resisted and contained.

Michael Keane is Professor of Chinese Media and Communications at Queensland University of Technology.

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