But, as is widely agreed, in the day-to-day management of the economy, we have two objectives, not one: price stability (as measured by the inflation target) and full employment (as not measured by any target).

This lopsidedness leaves us constantly tempted to err on the side of low inflation at the expense of low unemployment. That’s the unspoken message the lack of a numerical target is sending the economic managers, particularly the Reserve Bank. As I’ve written before, this omission may secretly suit the interests of business.

So if the Albanese government’s professed determination to get full employment back up on its pedestal alongside price stability is to be meaningful, it must involve setting two targets, not one.

Last week, one of the nation’s leading labour market economists, Professor Jeff Borland of Melbourne University, joined this debate. He doesn’t agree that the white paper was the right place for the government to nominate a specific numerical target.

But he does believe the managers of the macroeconomy require a numerical target. To achieve what the white paper calls the “maximum sustainable level of employment”, he says, “you need to know what it is”.

Borland accepts the white paper’s criticism of the present way of estimating full employment, the NAIRU, or non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment, which “evolves over time, is difficult to measure, and does not capture the full potential of the workforce” – a reference to underemployment and “potential workers”, who want to work but aren’t actively seeking a job, and so aren’t counter in the labour force.

Borland adds another criticism, that “estimation of the NAIRU has become a ‘black box’, making it almost impossible to understand why it is at a particular level at any time.”

So Borland accepts the government’s argument that, rather than relying solely on estimates of the NAIRU, “policymakers need a broad suite of measures to gauge the extent of current underutilisation [of labour]” and whether the labour market is close to the current maximum sustainable level of employment.

This means Borland rejects Martin’s argument that unemployment can stay the measure of full employment because it moves in line with underemployment (having a part-time job, but not as many hours as you want).

“The rate of unemployment is no longer sufficiently informative about labour underutilisation – and labour underutilisation is what we should care about for policymaking,” Borland says.

However, he dismissed the claims of other critics that the new full-employment objective is bad news for keeping inflation under control.

He quotes what the white paper says on the matter. The objective is to “keep employment as close as possible to the current maximum sustainable level of employment that is consistent with low and stable inflation”.

The plain truth is that there has always been much potential for conflict between the goal of price stability and the goal of full employment. Life is full of such conflicts.

And a key teaching of economics is that when you encounter two conflicting but highly desirable objectives, the answer is never to fly to one extreme or the other, as humans are so often tempted to do.

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No, economics teaches that what you should do is seek out the best available “trade-off” (combination) between the two, so you end up with as much of each the circumstances allow.

The point is that making sure we have explicit targets for both is the best way to motivate the economic managers to find the best trade-off available. Both the white paper and the recent independent review of the Reserve Bank’s performance imply that, in recent years, we haven’t been finding the best trade-off between the two.

But there’s still time for Chalmers to nominate a numerical employment target. Although the Reserve’s act requires it to achieve full employment, the review recommended that, in the setting of interest rates, the full-employment objective be raised to the same status as the inflation target.

The place for this to happen is in the imminent “statement on the conduct of monetary policy”, the agreement between the treasurer of the day and the governor that the treasurer has newly appointed.

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It was in the first of these agreements, in 1996, between Peter Costello and Ian Macfarlane, that the Howard government accepted the inflation target the Reserve had formulated as the government’s target.

In the upcoming agreement between Chalmers and new governor Michele Bullock, he could ask the Reserve to go away and come up with its own employment target.

But if he wants to be seen by the public as doing his job with diligence and the courage of his convictions, he will ask the new governor to accept an employment target the government has determined as the embodiment of the fine ambitions expressed in its white paper.