When the police officer-in-charge of investigating the Grose Valley Fire asked her forensic team to visit the site where the fire began, RFS staff directed the officers to the place that the backburn had spotted into the Grose Valley, and the site of ignition was never examined.

Loading

The RFS described the Grose Valley Fire in an internal report as a continuation of the Gospers Mountain Fire.

O’Sullivan found that this characterisation was misleading: “The Fire Investigation Report ought to have reflected what actually occurred at the scene; that is the Grose Valley Fire occurred as the unintended consequence of a strategic backburn lit in response to the Gospers Mountain Fire.”

The evidence was silent as to why the RFS did not conduct its own cause and origin investigation, she said. “To theorise why would result in impermissible speculation and conjecture.”

O’Sullivan recommended to the NSW Rural Fire Service Commissioner and NSW Police Commissioner that:

• bushfires suspected of having started as the unintended result of a strategic backburn should be expressly considered for referral to the coroner, as they relate to a safety matter of public interest
• police should be able to request modelling from the RFS into what might have occurred if the backburn had not taken place
• the officer-in-charge of a police investigation into the cause and origin of a fire should be notified if their request for the examination of a particular scene does not occur
• the RFS should review its training of Authorised Fire Investigators
• that where a wildfire has breached containment lines leading to a significant escalation of the fire, an Authorised Fire Investigator should examine the scene of the containment line breach.

But O’Sullivan accepted the evidence of the court-appointed expert that the backburn was appropriate in the circumstances, notwithstanding that the strategy had resulted in other backburn escapes earlier in the season.

Mountain Lagoon resident Kooryn Sheaves, who was caught beneath the escaped backburn at Berambing, said the language was weak and none of the recommendations would prevent a repeat event.

“There’s nothing compelling either of the government institutions, the RFS or the NSW Parks and Wildlife Service, to do anything differently and that’s why we will end up with more of the same,” Sheaves said.

She had hoped the coroner would recommend the appointment of an Inspector-General of Emergency Services, similar to the Victorian and Queensland models, whose mission was to investigate and report back quickly, so communities could move on.

Ten of the coroner’s 28 recommendations related to decisions about aircraft safety and when to deploy Very Large Air Tankers.

Loading

American firefighters Ian McBeth, 44, Paul Hudson, 42, and Rick DeMorgan, 43, died when their Large Air Tanker [LAT] crashed after dropping fire retardant on the Good Good Fire near Cooma on January 23, 2020.

An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report tendered at the hearing criticised the NSW Rural Fire Service for sending the aircraft to the area without aerial supervision and for not providing the pilot with sufficient information to make an informed decision.

The inquiry heard that other aircraft including a supervising plane known as a birddog had rejected the task to fly due to the dangerous conditions, but this had not been relayed to the crew of the LAT.

The coroner recommended that when one crew has rejected a task, that information is relayed to other aircraft likely to be tasked, the coronor recommended.

It should also ensure pilots were provided with a weather forecast, reports from the local area, any known hazards, a summary of assets and contact details for crew at the fireground.